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EDITOR'S BRIEF 
In this edition of the Colonial Lawyer, the staff has 
attempted to address several issues that are on the forefront of 
state and national legal and social debate. The article concern-
ing the Chesapeake Bay stresses the importance man has played in 
the decay of that estuary and the role we must all play in its 
resurrection. 
Greg Tolbert's article addresses the issue of marital rape. 
The article is the second in a two-part series. In 1986 Virginia 
amended its code, abandoned the common law marital rape exemption 
and statutorily prohibited marital rape. The article examines 
the new law and analyzes its purpose, scope and limitations. 
Another current debate in Virginia centers around water rights 
and uses. Sherri Davis and Bruce McDougal suggest that reform is 
necessary. 
Gary Close's article centers on a current crisis in zoning 
law as it affects churches and other religions organizations. 
This topic is of great debate in both Fairfax and Henrico 
counties in Virginia. The article analyzes the zoning law and 
suggests the analysis courts should apply when confronted with 
free exercise arguments offered by churches and religious 
organizations. The last article in this isse is a short commen-
tary by Dale Barney emphasizing the need of a small-claims court 
in Virginia. 
We, the staff of the Colonial Lawyer, welcome your comments 
and sincerely hope that this issue will alert our readers to the 
most current legal issues in Virginia and the nation. 
1 
~~~ ~. ~hompson Cravens 
Senior Editor 
THB TIMELBSS BBAUTY OP THB CHESAPEAKE BAY: 
WILL OUR GENERATION DBSTROY THIS REMARKABLE ESTUARY? 
Joe Cravens* 
VIRGINIANS, sound the alarm! Citizens of this nation pay heed. One of 
our nation's and surely Virginia's, most valuable resources is on the brink 
of destruction. Our state's magnificent and productive natural estuary, the 
Chesapeake Bay, is dying. Man, in all his grandeur, is responsible. For 
years, the unfettered drainage and dumping of chemical wastes, sewage, and 
agriculture fertilizers into the more than one hundred and fifty rivers, 
creeks, and streams which feed the Bay has limited the estuary's ability to 
cleanse itself. It is now in the hands of humans to attempt to reverse 
this course. If immediate steps are not taken to rehabilitate both the Bay 
and its tributaries, this marvelous body of water will become nothing more 
than an exhausted, polluted, dead natural resource laid waste by human 
development. 1 
The day has come for man to both realize and react to his impact upon 
the fragile environment surrounding him. Lord Byron said it best almost two 
centuries ago when inspired by the "austere grandeur" of the Swiss Alps on a 
visit in 1816: 
How beautiful is all this visible world! 
How glorious in its action and itself! 
But we, who name ourselves its sovereign, we, 
Half dust, half deity, alike unfit 
To sink or soar, with our mixed essence make 
A conflict of its elements, and breath 
The breath of degradation and of pride. 
Contending with low wants and lofty will, 
Till our mortality predominates. 2 
Concern has arisen recently over the complex ecosystem of our Bay. It is 
the largest and most productive estuary in the United States, providing food 
and a hub of commerce to Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania since colonial 
times. The living resources of the bay constitute a vital part of the 
United States fishing industry. Unfortunately the Bay's seafood harvest has 
been declining steadily during the past several years due primarily to the 
*Joe Cravens is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe, Sr. Editor of the 
Colonial Lawyer, and a member of the William and Mary National Moot Court 
Team. His last article in the Colonial Lawyer, which he co-authored, ~
the Minor's Right: The Minor's Abortion Decision in Virginia, was cited in 
the "Worth Reading" column of the November 24, 1986 edition of the National 
Law Journal. 
1 See Christian Science Monitor, Mar. 5, 1984, at B15, Col. 1; see also 
Marjorie Hutler, 4 VA. J. NAT. RESOORCES L. at 185, 1984-85. 
2 George Gordon, Lord Byron - Manfred: "A dramatic poem" referred to 
by Byron as "a drama of ideas." It is with hunble intentions that we, the 
staff of the Colonial Lawver, inspired by the great blue waters of the 
Chesapeake Bay, endeavor to write; that "she" may be saved - for us - and 
posterity. 
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deteriorating water quality of the Bay.3 The Bay and its tributaries are il 
the midst of the megalopolis that stretches from Boston to Richmond. II 
is not surprising that this carefully balanced system should be disturbed b~ 
the impact of intense and steadily increasing human activity.4 The Bay cal 
be saved 1 however, to do so will require the prudent decisions of statE 
legislatures and local governments across the eastern seaboard. Concertec 
efforts must be made at all levels to effectively inhibit the ability oj 
pollutants to enter tributaries flowing to the Bay. 
I. Problems Created by Bay Pollution 
Pollutants which flow from tributaries and enter the Bay are not 
quickly dispersed or absorbed by its waters and flushed into the vast 
Atlantic Ocean. The circulation patterns in the Bay are unique, both ir 
flowing fresh water and in-flowing ocean water. These conditions, whict 
make Bay ecosystems some of the most biologically productive on earth, alse 
act to hold within the estuary the pollutants that reach the Bay by tribu-
taries. 5 These pollutants have accumulated over the years and now are 
acting to gradually destroy the productive nature of the waters. Over-
enrichment with nutrients (phosphorus and nitrogen), contamination by 
toxics, and a rapid decline in the amount of submerged aquatic vegetation 
(SAV) in the Bay are all a result of the pollution. 6 Another problerr 
involves the large areas of the Chesapeake Bay which have low or no dissolv-
ed oxygen (DO). Between 1950 and 1980, the size of these areas increased by 
a multiple of fifteen. The extent of the DO problem is evidenced by 
the fact that nfrom May through September [1983] in an area reaching from 
the Annapolis Bay Bridge to the Rappahannock River, much of the water deeper 
than 40 feet has no oxygen and, therefore, is devoid of life. n7 
Can we as Virginians comprehend the magnitude of a Bay devoid of life? 
If this continues, if this trend is not immediately put to a halt, we could 
be faced with this de~astating reality, and in our lifetime. The famed 
seaman Jacques Cousteau has warned such and pointed to the example of the 
Mediterranean Sea. This cannot be allowed to occur. If we fail to take 
both preventive and corrective (rehabilitative action)1 we may soon only 
remember those world renowned Chesapeake Bay Blue Point Oysters or the 
succulent blue and soft shell crabs, or Bay scallops. Already we have seen 
the striped bass population, the fish that at one time was the Bay's 
mainstay, eroded to levels such that the species now requires govern-
3 Warren and Kindt, Land-Based Pollution and the Chesapeak Bay, 42 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1099, 1100 (1985). 
4 Eichbaum, Cleaning Up the Chesapeake Bay, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. 10237, 
10238 (1984). 
5 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM: 
FINDIN;S AND REXl)MMENDATIONS 19 (1983). 
6 Eichbaum, ~ note 4, at 10239. 
7 Warner & Kindt, supra note 3, at 1111, citing EPA Chesapeake Bay 
Findings, supra note 5, at 22. 
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mental protection. The loss of these species will mean more than the mere 
loss of dietary delicacies. The pollution of the Bay and the decline in 
submerged aquatic vegetation (SAV) may have even more devastating effects on 
the nation's ecology. 
Twenty species of SAV occur in the Bay, in water less than three meters 
deep. SAV stabilizes sediments, baffles current, reduces shore erosion, 
buffers against nutrient runoff, and serves as food for aquatic species and 
waterfowl. SAV zones provide some of the most favorable habitat in the 
Bay.8 The Bay is one of the flyway routes for Canada Geese, ducks and 
many other northern waterfowl. Quite possibly, this complex ecosystem could 
become so polluted that these transient birds will no longer survive the 
southern flight because of Bay pollution. These beautiful creatures could 
be forced to reroute natural flyways because of lack of food and clean water 
in the Bay region. The ramifications of a dead Bay are too astounding to 
calculate. Our only choice is to band together as a state and as a nation 
and save this resource from destruction. 
II. Pollution Control Proposals 
In 1976 the EPA began a five year project to research, study and 
identify the ecological problems threatening the fragile ecosystem of the 
Bay. Completed in 1981, the studies resulted in a practical set of recom-
mendations. The final product of research and recommendations were five 
written essays, and they form the basis of most of the knowledge we have 
today about pollution of the Bay, the sources of that pollution, and its 
effects upon the Bay.9 
In the efforts to save the Chesapeake Bay, pollution controls must be 
implemented in several ,specific areas: 1) sewage treatment, 2) industrial 
pollution/waste product discharges, 3) reduction of non-point source 
agriculture pollution and 4) pollution limitation of industrial toxic waste 
disposal. lO If measures in these areas are not successfully undertaken, the 
environmental threshold could be crossed. Crossing this threshold - where 
8 Hutter, supra note 1, at 223 n. 27, citing Citizens Program for 
Chesapeake Bay, CHOICES FOR THE CHESAPEAKE: AN ACTION AGENDA 60 (October 
1983) (workshop recommendations to the December 1983 conference) at 6. 
9 ~ sUPra note 5, U.S. Envirorane,1tal Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE 
BAY PROORAM TEX:HNICAL S'ruDIES: A SYNI'HESIS (1982) (a Slml!ary of the techni-
cal knowledge gained from numerous research projects concerning particular 
problems). U.S. Enviroranental Protection Agency, CHESAPEARE BAY: INl'ROOOC-
TION TO AN ECOSYSTEM (1982) (a description of the ecological systems of the 
Bay and the components which make up its complex ecosystem and the relation-
ship of those components.) [hereinafter CHESAPEAKE BAY ECOSYSTEM]. U.S. En-
vironmental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A FRAME.W)RK FOR ACTION 
(1983) (a description of current conditions in the Bay and recommendations 
for the future restoration of the estuary) [hereinafter A F~RK FOR 
ACTION]. U.S. Enviroranental Protection Agency, CHESAPEAKE BAY: A PROFIT.E 
OF ENVIRONMENl'AL CHANGE (1983) (slml!arizing the past and present character 
of the Bay) [hereinafter A PROFILE OF CHAN:>E] • 
10 Eichbaum, supra note 4, at 10241. Efforts to rehabilitate the bay 
are not restricted to these areas. These are the areas of greatest concern 
however because these several areas constitute the major portion of the 
current threat to the Chesapeake Bay. 
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water quality moves just below that point which allows the survival of basic 
species - would bring death to most living organisms in the Bay. BecausE 
of the unique circulation of the Bay's waters - once this threshold iE 
reached - the Bay will not quickly flush itself. Because of this severell 
limited assimilative capacity and "irreversible despoilation as the probablE 
result nll of crossing the environmental threshold, we as Virginians must 
work now to cleanse our waters, our life's blood. 
A. Sewage Treatment 
It is essential that states whose municipal sewage treatment plante 
drain into the tributaries flowing to the Bay impose more stringent regula-
tions on those municipal treatment plants to remove excess nutrients. waste-
water treatment techniques currently employed by many municipalities across 
the east coast, but especially in Virginia, Maryland, and the District of 
Columbia, fail to remove many pollutants, particularlyphosphorus. These 
pollutants are discharged in massive quantities into the upper Bay.12 
The magnitude and impact of sewage waste water on the Bay is illustrat-
ed by the fact that "[o]ver 1,000 sewage treatment plants are located on the 
Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries. n13 Each day they contribute more than 
one and a half billion gallons of treated wastewater to our rivers and 
streams and [ultimately] to the Bay.14 As large as the Bay is, these 
numbers are astounding. They are astounding even if we assume that all of 
the wastewater reaching the Bay has been properly treated, but this is not 
always the case. Wastewater pumped into rivers and streams nfrequently does 
not meet the requirements established by the government, even when those 
requirements are lax, as they often are. n15 This is unacceptable! To 
resolve the crisis facing the Bay, much more must be done. If the Bay is 
inadequately assimilating the pollutants reaching it today - what will occur 
with development and increased sewage demands? If we know that the future 
will require greater amounts of wastewater to be dumped into the Bay and its 
tributaries, logic requires us to demand now treatment that will greatly 
reduce the amount of pollutants present in the dischargeable wastewater. 
For years, many people believed that the Bay had an unlimited capacity 
to assimilate hUman wastes. n16 Now we know this is not true. states have 
begun to take action, but we, as concerned citizens, must insure that 
legislation equates to compliance, which is often not the case with regard 
to environmental protection legislation. Our government has been far to lax 
in punishment and enforcement efforts. Penalties must be established that 
11 Warner & Kindt, §.YI2m note 3, at 1102. 
12 ~ EichbalUll, supra note 4, at 10241. 
13 A. Powers, ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE: KEY ProBLEMS 12 (1985). 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
16 ~ §.YI2m note 5, at 19. 
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will convey to polluters the severity and consequences of continued misuses 
of the environment. 
Maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia have 
begun unified action,17 but citizens must press for further Bay relief 
programs. with regard to the Chesapeake Bay, there is no room for mistake, 
there is no place for mismanagement, and there is no time for delay. It is 
clear that much of what will occur to end the pollution of our rivers and 
streams will occur at the local and state level. 18 Thus, small groups of 
concerned citizens can have a real impact on how local governments and 
city planning commissions approach and manage the problem of sewage treat-
ment in their respective communities. Federal and state standards exist, 
but these are the minimal requirements. Communities should push themselves 
not to meet the standards, but to exceed these standards and by as much as 
possible. When we as a people begin to confront problems with this atti-
tude, maybe, just maybe, immediate and substantial progress can be made. 
There has been proposed federal legislation that could greatly enhance 
the ability of state and local government to fund intensified pollution 
control measures. On January 3, 1985, Maryland Representative Ray Dyson 
introduced Chesapeake Bay Legislation. 19 This bill would amend the Clean 
Water Act to authorize EPA to disburse ten million dollars a year in 
matching grants to states, through fiscal year 1989, to implement the 
interstate management plans developed pursuant to the "Chesapeake Bay 
Agreement."20 The amendments would also authorize three million dollars 
annually for the states to study point source and nonpoint source dis-
charges into the Bay.2l Funding for virtually any project is a source of 
17 The District of Columbia has established a policy that will 
control urban runoff as well as concomitant sewer overflows by 1989. 
Maryland allocated over $70 million to the cleanup effort by authorizing: 
(1) the establishment of a comprehensive storm water mangement program, (2) 
an improved and upgraded system of treatment plants, and (3) a program to 
preserve land adjacent to tributaries. Virginia's 2 year contribution 
towards cleaning up the Bay was 13.3 million. the plan was directed at 
controlling point source pollution, identifyin conconcentrations of orgami-
cides and toxic metals, and providing controls on nonpoint source pollution 
caused by botha griculture and urban runoff. Pennsylvania established a 
plan for the susquehanna River to curb the entrance of phosphates, from 
treated sewage discharges, and reduce the level of nutrients in washwater 
after treatment. These controls to limit pollutants in the Susquehanna are 
important because the river cosntitutes the larges source of freshwater 
entering the Bay. Warner, ~ note 3, at 1122, 23. 
18 See Flynn, The Critical Role of the States, 55 J. WATER POLLUTION 
CONTROL FED'N 1224 (1983): and J. CAPPER, G. POWER & F.R. SHIVERS, JR. CHES-
APEAKE WATERS 12 (1983). 
19 H.R. 9, 99th Congo 1st Sess. (1985). 
20 The Chesapeake Bay Agreement of 1983 was a result of a conference 
of the Governors of Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania, the Mayor of 
Washington D.C. , and the Administrator of the EPA. Each member proposed 
an haction agenda" which was to be implemented in a "joint initiative" to 
~ave the Chesapeak Bay. The text of the agrements is printed in, Citizens 
Program for the Chesapeake Bay, CHOICES FOR THE CHESAPEAKE: AN ACTION 
AGENDA 6, 17 (1984). 
21 Hutter, supra note 8, at 194. 
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great debate in the American political process, especially at the local 
level where even small projects have the potential to strain the budget. 
Therefore any federal assistance, such as matching funds, would surely help 
to alleviate some of the burden facing local planners when attempting to 
decide whether the implementation of heightened pollution control measures 
is possible. 
If multistate cooperation is to succeed in controlling point source 
pollution of the Bay and its tributaries, local authorities must exercise 
their enforcement authority. No longer can violators be tolerated. 
Ironically, those communities in Virginia most concerned with the continued 
health and survival of the Chesapeake Bay are the communities whose sewer 
systems and inadequate sewage treatment plants are major Bay polluters. 22 
The inflow of urban rainwater runoff into sewer lines causes the capacity of 
sewage treatment plants located on the James River near Newport News, 
Hampton Roads, and Cape Charles, Virginia to often be exceeded. Those 
plants are then forced to discharge wastewater containing high levels of nu-
trients, bacteria, and sewage solids directly into the James. 23 In the 
entire Bay region, this sewage problem is most serious in communities on the 
lower James in Virginia. Something must be done. Virginians must help 
themselves before seeking assistance from others. We must lead this charge 
by example. The battle has begun and the intolerable discharge of pollutant 
filled wastewater into the Chesapeake Bay and its tributaries must end. It 
must end in New York. It must end in Pennsylvania. It must end in the 
District of Columbia. It must end in Maryland, and certainly it must end in 
our own backyard. America is a nation founded with citizen action led by 
Virginians, and it would be a grave mistake to tarnish that heritage by the 
failure of Virginians to fulfill their obligation to state and country 
today. 
B. Industrial Compliance 
Our government must insure that industrial compliance with the Clean 
Water Act 24 is fact rather than fiction. We as citizens of this Common-
wealth have the legal right to protect our environment; with respect to 
industrial polluters, it is imperative that we exercise these rights. In a 
recent decision in Virginia, Gwaltney of Smithfield, Virginia was sued by 
the Chesapeake Bay Foundation, a citizens environmental organization. 25 
22 See Commonwealth of Virginia Council on Environment, Water Control 
Bd., Soi & Water Conservation Comm'n and Dep't of Marine Resources, Virginia 
Chesapeak Bay Initiatives, 1984-86 (Apr. 30, 1984) (a table of Virginia 
General Assembly Appropriations) • 
23 Hutter, ~ note 8, at 203 n. 128, citing Virginia Bay Initia-
tives, ~ note 22, at C-2 (emphasis added) • 
24 33 U.S.C. §§125l (1982). 
25 611 F.Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va. 1985) The suit was authorized by 
Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §1365, as a "Citizen suit" to 
enforce compliance with federal law. 
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A federal judge fined Gwaltney a total of $1,285,322. 26 This award was 
affirmed by the United states Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 27 
This decision illustrates that private citizens and citizen organizations 
can playa major role in the protection of our precious environment. In 
Mary~and, Chesapeake Bay Foundation suits have spurred the state officials 
to double the number of personnel assigned to industrial compliance. 
Actions filed by the state have increased dramatically.28 If anything, 
citizen awareness has spurred the state to take important action. 
C. Reduction of Non-Point Source Agriculture Pollution 
For years, the farming community failed to comprehend the devastating 
effects its land use practices had on Virginia's waters. The practice of 
cUltivation of highly erodable soils dramatically increases the amount of 
sediment that reaches the Bay. The improvident use of fertilizers and 
pesticides also pollute our waterways with excessive amounts of nutrients, 
especially nitrogen, and toxics. Agricultural practices have significantly 
contributed to the decline of the Bay.29 The increase in nutrients stimula-
tes growth of algae and phytoplankton and prevents the dissolution of 
oxygen. 30 The lack of oxygen affects the survival of fish indigenous to the 
estuary, and will if not controlled, prevent the populations from ever 
returning. 
For successful changes to be undertaken, state agriculture and conser-
vationists must convince farmers that the containment of erosion problems 
are in the best interest of both the community and the farmer. The first 
problem with this approach is that the technical resources for advising 
farmers as to how to reduce runoff pollution and erosion have not been 
available at the soil conservation district level.3l The major problem 
however is that too little financial assistance has been made available to 
farmers to induce them to correct certain agricultural practices. Their 
livelihood is farming, and it is understandable that they irrigate wherever 
practicable and fertilize to get the most from each crop. The solution lies 
with more money and technical advice. We as a society should fund these 
projects because we are not blameless with respect to agricultural pollu-
tion. We cannot expect farmers to bear the burden of the cost of Bay 
cleanup. Incentive payments and matching grants to help farmers control 
erosion and runoff could benefit everyone. The Bay study, A Framework For 
26 lQ., at 1565 (Merhige, D.J.). 
27 Chesapeake Bay Foundation v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 791 F.2d 304 
(4th Cir. 1986). 
28 A. POWERS, ~ note 13, at 13. 
29 Lindon & Gergen, Interagency Disputes Over Dry Fields or Clean 
Water: A Case Study of the Conflict Between Agricultural Drainage Programs 
and the Chesapeake Bay Cleanup, 4 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCES L.2l9, 221 
(1985) 
30 
31 Eichbaum, ~ note 4, at 10243. 
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Action, found that runoff from cropland and other non-point sources is the 
major source of nitrogen to the nutrient enriched areas of the Bay.32 The 
evidence clearly establishes that these farming practices must be eliminat-
ed, and they can. They cannot be eliminated, however, if we choose not to 
spend the money necessary to bring about meaningful change. 
D. Limitation of Industrial Toxic waste Disposal 
Throughout the industrial revolution, America permitted industrial 
growth and advancement at both the expense of human and environmental 
health. With the New Deal in the 1930s our government began taking specific 
steps to restrict industrial exploitation of the work force. It was not 
until years later that sUbstantive steps were taken to attempt to restrict 
industrial exploitation of our environment. 
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 197233 announced 
a federal presence in efforts to restore and maintain the "biological integ-
rity of the nations waters" by developing technology necessary to eliminate 
the discharge of pollutants into those waters. 34 The 1977 Clean Water Act35 
significantly amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 
1972. The Clean Water Act implemented an entirely new federal strategy for 
the control of toxics and the discharge of these materials into the nations 
waters, EPA "Best Available Technology Toxics", to be regulated by per-
mits. 36 The state of Virginia under the authority of the National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program37 assumed control of the 
permit system in 1975 after the State Water Control 1aw38 was amended to 
give authority to the State Water Control Board to enforce the federal and 
state regulations. Under the Act, States have the authority to establish 
standards more stringent than EPA 1imitations. 39 Virginia has been reluc-
tant to develop new and independent limitations regarding the discharge of 
toxic wastes into industrial waste streams and has been lax in enforcing 
existing standards. 
32 Lindon & Gergen, ~ note 29, at 221, citing A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ACTION, supra note 9, at 61. Non-point source po11utsants contribute 67% of 
the total nitrogen load to the Bay in a year of average rainfall. Farmland 
contributes 60-75 percent of that total figure. 
33 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1376 (1982). 
34 Watson, Point Source Water Quality Control in Virginia: Choices 
for the Chesapeake, 4 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCES L. 263, 275 (1985). 
35 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. 
36 LQ. at 53, 91 Stat. at 1589 (codified at 33 U.S.C. §1317 (1982». 
Best Available Technology (BAT) apply to entities discharging "priority 
toxic pollutants" of which there are 126. These pollutants are defined in 
NRDC v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.DC 1976). See Watson, ~ note 34, at 
277 n. 88. 
37 
(1982) • 
38 
39 
Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments (1972), 33 U.S.C. §1342 
VA. CODE ANN. §62.1-44.15(5) (1982). 
Watson, ~ note 34, at 282. 
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The Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA in 1984 to review the 
Virginia NPDES program charging that the water Control Board was administra-
tively continuing industrial and municipal permits. The state Water Control 
Board must strictly monitor all recipients of permits if the Bay is to be 
saved. Dilatorious administrative continuance of permits defies the entire 
process and minimizes the effect of legislation which is already years 
late. This intolerable defiance cannot be permitted, even if it means 
federal overseers doing spotchecks at permit sites on a daily basis. 
Virginia cannot permit the few offenders to spoil the Chesapeake Bay for us 
all. 
III. Current Crisis 
On Thursday, November 6, 1986, President Reagan vetoed an $18 biliion 
extension of the clean water act. This veto if not overridden by Congress, 
could have placed a padlock on that treasure chest of natures bounty we call 
the Chesapeak Bay. 
Without adequate funding, adequate protection programs will not exist. 
Without these programs, the timeless beauty of the seven hundred miles of 
shoreline along the bay could cease to be timeless. Congress must address 
the actions of the President and Virginias must assert the necessity of 
saving the Bay. An $18 billion dollar expenditure to save the nations 
waters is long overdue. Local governments accross the United states are 
dependant upon those federal dollars to improve sewer systems that are in 
need of repair and rehabilitation. 
Every American should realize just how much this money means to our 
health and future. The extension of the 1972 Clean Water Act will most 
likely be reintroduced in January of 1987 by senator Daniel P. Moynihan, 
a Democrat from New York, who is in line to become the Chairman of the 
Environment Subcommittee on water resources in the new Congress. With 
public support, this time the legislation could be successful. We as 
Virginians must act to provide that necessary support. 
Conclusion 
If we as a society are to continue to enjoy the fruits of this precious 
earth on which we live, it is imperative that we act in concert to preserve 
and repair the elements that our lives wreak havock upon. The problems 
which face our state in preserving the Chesapeake Bay, though national in 
character, can and must be addressed at the state and local level. This 
means that the private citizen or groups of concerned citizens can and must 
make their feelings known. They must utilize their voices and their votes 
to force state and local political leaders to address this important 
environmental issue. The preservation of the Chesapeake Bay is not a 
political issue nor a party issue. The magnitude and importance of the 
Chesapeake Bay to Virginia and the world transcends political bounds. Each 
and every living being on this planet today and those which will reside on 
the earth in the futUre are concerned parties. The problems can be solved, 
10 
but they will only be solved if states and localities begin to implement 
pollution control standards that exceed minimal requirements. Each state, 
each locality, bears the burden of doing everything within the bounds of 
reason to reduce the level of pollutants that enter the rivers and streams 
of this great state. When we reach this level of social awareness, we will 
have reached the point at which the Chesapeake Bay can begin a rebirth. 
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WA'l'ER RIGB'fS LAW IN VIRGINIA: 
YIIIB POR RBPORII? 
Bruce McDouga1* 
Sherri L. Davis** 
Virginia, as an historically rural and agrarian state in the 
humid East, has only recently been forced to face the legal and 
institutional issues involved in managing and allocating water, a 
finite natural resource. Laws which have altered the basic 
common law principles governing water rights have been passed in 
response to rapid urban growth in Northern and Southeastern 
Virginia, several recent droughts in the state, and intergovern-
mental conflicts arising from localities' refusal to share their 
access to water resources. For the most part, Virginia enacted 
water rights legislation in the aftermath of water crises, and 
subsequently has been interpreted and adapted so that it has 
little effect on the underlying problems which it was meant to 
address. 
This article will outline virginia's common law of water 
rights, which is applicable to most of the state, discuss 
statutory law in its current state, anQ discuss the possibility 
of future legislative proposals. 
water rights in Virginia, absent statutory law, are governed 
exclusively by the common law; thus the only enforcement mechan-
ism is the private 1awsuit. 1 The courts have retained the 
historic common law distinction between surface water and 
groundwater rights. 
Surface water rights in streamflow are called riparian 
rights, while those in lakes are littoral rights. These two 
surface water rights doctrines are basically the same, but 
conflicts more often arise in connection with riparian rights. 
Riparian rights are incident to the ownership of land bordering 
or crossed by a stream. 2 However, "riparian land is ••• 1imited in 
*Bruce McDougal is a 1st year law student at Marshall-Wythe and 
the Managing Editor of the Colonial Lawyer. 
**Sherri L. Davis is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe and 
Research Editor of the Colonial Lawyer. Her previous article in 
the Colonial Layer, on marital rape, was reprinted in the 
virginia Gazette. 
1 For several more detailed discussions of the common law 
governing water rights in Virginia, see W.E. Cox, Water Supply 
Management in Virginia, 61 Institute of Government Newsletter, 
57 (1985); L.L. Butler, Defining Public Consumptive Rights in 
Virginia's Rivers. streams. and Lakes: Is Legislative Reform 
Needed? VA. B.A.J. 14 (1985); W.E. Cox and L. A. Shabman, 
Institutional Issues Affecting Water Supply Development: 
Illustrations from Southeastern virginia, Virginia Water Resour-
ces Research Center Annual Allotment Project A-076 (1982). 
2 Town of Purcellville v. Potts, 179 Va. 514, 521, 19 S.E.2d 
700, 702 (1942). 
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its extent by the watershed of the stream; in other words, lands 
beyond the watershed cannot be regarded as riparian, though part 
of a single tract, held in a common ownership, which borders on 
the stream."3 As a further restriction, only those parcels which 
are owned by one person, acquired in one transaction, and 
bordering a stream are riparian to that stream. 4 
A riparian landowner's use of water must be for the benefit 
of the riparian land and the use must be reasonable. BReasonable 
use" is defined in the context of the needs of all other riparian 
landowners: "A proprietor may make any reasonable use of the 
water of the stream in connection with his riparian estate and 
for lawful purposes within the watershed, provided he leaves the 
current diminished by no more than is reasonable, having regard 
for the like right to enjoy the common property of other riparian 
owners. n5 Historically, there has been a hierarchy of reasonable 
uses: 
First, the primary use is for natural and domestic 
purposes, in order to supply the wants of man and 
animal, and each owner of the land, through or by which 
the stream flows, is at liberty to take as much as may 
be necessary for these purposes, even if it be thereby 
entirely consumed in the use. Second, he may also use 
the same for agricultural purposes such as irrigation, 
and for manufacturing purposes, but for these purposes 
he shall use the same in a reasonable manner, so as not 
to destroy or render useless or materially diminish the 
flow, so as to affect the application of the water by 
the riparian proprietors below, and if ••• he temporarily 
diverts a part of the stream, ,Fe must cause same to be 
returned to the channel below. 
Virginia ascribes to the reasonable use theory, whereby -in 
an action for damages or suit for injunction by a lower against 
an upper riparian landowner for wrongful diversion of water by 
the latter, ••• the plaintiff in order to prevail must show some 
substantial actual damage occasioned by the diminution of the 
quantity of the water which the plaintiff has the right to use."7 
"The only question is whether there is actual injury to the lower 
estate for any present or future reasonable use. The diversion 
alone, without evidence of such damage, does not warrant a 
3 Town of Gordonsville v. Zinn, 129 Va. 542, 551, 106 
S.E. 508, 511 (1921). 
4 19. at 553, 106 S.E. at 512. 
5 Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Hoover., 143 Va. 460, 467, 130 
S.E. 408, 410 (1925), citing Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 
216 Mass. 83, 85, 103 N.E. 87,89 (1913). 
6 Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Graham Land & Improve-
ment Co., 10 Va. L. reg. 983, 984 (Cir. Ct. 1904). 
7 Town of Gordonsville, 129 Va. at 560, 106 S.E. at 514. 
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recovery even of nominal damages. a8 
Riparian rights are separable from the underlying land and 
may be conveyed through sale,9 condemnation,lO or prescription. ll 
It is a well settled doctrine that there may be a conveyance of 
water or water rights separate and apart from the land there-
under, and that such a conveyance is a conveyance of a property 
right. 12 These separable riparian rights can only be used in 
conformance with the reasonable use doctrine; however one 
Virginia case indicates that diversion to non-riparian land is 
aan extraordinary and not a reasonable use. n13 
Rights in groundwater can take two forms: absolute owner-
ship or reasonable use. The Virginia Supreme Court has not 
indicated which doctrine prevails in Virginia: in Clinchfield 
Coal Corp. v. Compton,14 the court discussed both forms of owner-
ship, and finally refused to take a position, as the defendants' 
use of the land in coal mining operations qualified as either 
type of ownership. 
The court said: 
[T]he fee-simple owner of the land [is] the owner of 
everything above and below the earth, expressed in the 
maxim, [cllajus est solum, ~ est usgue QQ coelum et 
ad inferos ••• This doctrine allows a landowner to make 
any use he pleases of underlying percolating waters; he 
may even cut l~em off maliciously without liability to 
his neighbor. 
Of reasonable use the court said: 
The nreasonable usen rule does not forbid the use of 
percolating water for all purposes properly connected 
with the use, enjoyment, and development of the land 
itself, but it does forbid maliciously cutting it off, 
its unnecessary waste, or withdrawal for sale or 
distribution for uses not connected with the ~gneficial 
enjoyment of the land from which it is taken. 
This definition of reasonable use allows any use beneficial 
to the land; this differs from the definition of reasonable use 
of surface water, which compares on riparian user to all others 
8 virginia Bot Springs Co., 143 Va. at 467. See also supra 
note 5. 
9 Bite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. 218, 224, 8 S.E.2d 369, 371 
(1940) • 
10 Potts, 179 Va. at 525, 19 S.E.2d at 704. 
11 Town of Gordonsville, 129 Va. at 560, 106 S·.E. at 514. 
12 Thurston v. Town of Portsmouth, 205 Va. 909, 913, 140 
S.E.2d 678, 681 (1965); Bite v. Town of Luray, 175 Va. at 224, 8 
S.E.2d at 37l. 
13 Potts, 179 Va. at 521, 19 S.E.2d at 704. 
14 148 Va. 437, 454, 139 S.E. 308, 313 (1927). 
15 Id. at 451, 139 S.E. at 313. 
16 19. at 452, 139 S.E. at 313. 
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using the same source. 
Although the common law has governed water rights in the 
Commonwealth since the colonial period, the various doctrines 
continue {o be refined, clarified and adapted to meet contempor-
ary needs. This has created both confusion and an unusual 
opportunity for creative advocates to shape the primary body of 
law relating to Virginia water rights. 
Virginia's present statutory system of groundwater control 
is codified in Code of Virginia sections 62.1-44.83 ~ ~, the 
Groundwater Act of 1973. It provides that any area declared by 
the state water Control Board to be a "groundwater management 
area" is subject to the provisions outlined in the Act. Only two 
areas were declared in 1973 to be "groundwater management 
southeastern Virginia, south of the James River, 
including the counties of Prince George, Sussex, Southampton, 
Surry, Isle of Wight, and the cities of Norfolk and Virginia 
Beach1 and the Eastern Shore of Virginia. Any locality or the 
State Board itself may initiate proceedings to have any area of 
the state declared a "gr.oundwater management area", however, no 
additional areas have been established since 1973. 
Generally, the Act requires a user to obtain a permie for 
withdrawal of groundwater or an increase in groundwater use, and 
the State Water Control Board approves or disapproves increased 
use based on statutory criteria specified in the Act. 
Initially, the Act was criticized for its broad exemptions 
from the permitting system, which included agricultural uses, use 
for human consumption or domestic purposes, and certain indus-
trial and commercial uses. 17 These exemptions, coupled with an 
opinion of the Attorney General, which stated that withdrawal of 
water by municipalities for mixed domestic, industrial and 
commercial purposes falls within the exempted use category, 
rendered the Act virtually ineffective in controlling groundwater 
use within the "groundwater management area." 
In the last session of the General Assembly, it was proposed 
that all categorical exemptions be eliminated and that a very 
narrow general exemption for water withdrawals of less than 
10,000 gallons a day be imposed.1 8 The agricultural lobby 
opposed the elimination of the agricultural use exemption, thus, 
the legislature retained the exemption, with the condition that 
agricultural users of more than 300,000 gallons per month ~ be 
required to report the amount of their withdrawals. 
Subsequently, the General Assembly passed a resolution 
giving agricultural water use reporting responsibilities to local 
Virginia Tech Extension Service agents. The bill's proposed 
17 VA. CODE ANN. §62.l-44.87, (19 ). 
18 H. 561 1986 Sess. 
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10,000 gallons per day use limitation for exemption from permit 
requirements was amended before passage, to 300,000 gallons per 
month, and an exemption was added for uses by groundwater heat 
pumps, which fall under a separate permit requirement of Virginia 
Water Control Law. Thus, the amended section reads: 
No certificate of groundwater right, permit or regis-
tration statement ••• shall be required for any water 
withdrawal of less than 300,000 gallons a month or for 
groundwater withdrawn for agricultural or livestock 
purposes.... [T]he Board may be regulation require 
persons in any groundwater management area who withdraw 
more than 300,000 gallons of water per month for 
agricultural and livestock purposes to report the 
amount of such withdrawal. Nor shall any certificate 
of groundwater right, permit or registration statement 
be required for the withdrawal of groundwater for use 
by a groundwater heat ~9rP for which a permit has been 
issued by the Board •••• 
The effect of this 1986 amendment is to eliminate the 
exemption of municipalities from permit requirements, its 
effectiveness in increasing state control over conflicts arising 
from use of limited groundwater in the southeastern portion of 
the state has yet to be seen. 
The 1986 Session of the General assembly also enacted the 
Private Well Construction Act,20 which generally requires 
application for and receipt of a permit from the state Department 
of Health prior to construction of any well in the Commonwealth. 
Thus, the role of the state in groundwater management 
remains limited in areas of the state not declared "groundwater 
management areas." In the majority of counties of the state, the 
common law governs allowable withdrawal of groundwater. 
Legislative reform of water rights in Virginia is desperate-
ly needed, yet the General Assembly has not been able to effect a 
workable solution to water allocation problems, which become more 
acute with each drought that the state suffers. Legislators from 
the eastern portion of the state, which has been hit most hard by 
recent droughts, are eager to implement some type of permitting 
or other allocation system. On the other hand, legislators from 
the western part of the state do not perceive the problem as one 
which requires an immediate solution. 
This legislative standstill has prompted the State Water 
Control Board to introduce bills to the General Assembly over the 
past several years. Prior to the 1986 session of the General 
Assembly, the state Water Control Board held statewide public 
hearings on its legislative proposals and fond public sentiment 
strongly against implementation of a statewide water use permit-
ting system. Legislative reception to the State Board's initia-
tive has also been less than enthusiastic, only the previously 
19 VA. CODE ANN. §62.l-44.87, (1986). 
20 VA. CODE ANN. §32.l76.l, ~ ~, (1986). 
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mentioned legislation, extremely limited in its scope, was 
passed by the General Assembly in 1986. Thus the state water 
Control Board will limit its legislative initiative in the 
upcoming 1987 session of the General Assembly. The Board's only 
anticipated introduction of legislation is a bill which would 
modify the newly implemented agricultural water use reporting 
system to make reporting mandatory. Although such a proposal, if 
6ti is passed, may aid the state in monitoring one type of water 
use in other than "groundwater management areas", it is a far cry 
from needed use control reform. 
Until a statewide permitting system or other use control 
system is implemented, the state of Virginia will be forced to 
deal with its seasonal water crises on an ad hoc basis. The 
inefficiency of this type of response to resource management 
calls for legislative reform of Virginia water rights law. 
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Gregory Tolbert* 
Legal scholars are proud to point to the fact that law evolves over time. As 
societal values change, the law usually has witnessed a carmensurate change. Few 
would deny that the law as we know it tcx1ay has changed a great deal from 1736. 
However, the law has been very slow to depart from the marital rape exemption first 
articulated by English Chief Justice Matthew Hale, who stated that nthe husband 
cannot be guilty of a rape cOIllDitted by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their 
mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given herself in this kind unto 
her husband, which she cannot retract. nl 
Although n Is] ociety recognizes rape as one of the most serious violent crimes, 
one which scars its victims emotionally as well as physically, n2 few states are 
willing to abandon the common law exemption. As a result, the marital rape exemption 
"denies a married woman the right, which a single woman has, to legal recourse against 
her attacker."3 
Today twenty-eight states continue to recognize the marital rape exemption and 
prohibit the prosecution of a husband for the rape of his wife. Only eight states 
(Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, Oregon and Wisconsin) 
have statutorily eliminated the marital rape exemption. 
The law governing marital rape in Virginia recently has been changed. 4 While 
Virginia has not abandoned the marital rape exemption completely, it indeed has taken 
a step in that direction. The Significance of the action by the virginia legislature 
is still in question. 5 However, virginia has added itself to the list of jurisdic-
tions that question Chief Justice Hale's vision of the marriage contract. 
This article explores the 1986 amendments6 to the Code of Virginia as they 
*Gregory Tolbert is a 1st year law student at Marshall-wythe and as a menber of a 
debate team at Lewis and Clark College debated marital rape laws. 
1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 629 (1736). 
2 CO!TIIlent, Marital Rape: The Legislative Battle, 15 Colonial Law. 21 (1986). 
3 Note, The Marital Rape Exemption: A Violation of a Woman's Right of Privacy, 
11 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 717, 718 (1981). 
4 Va. Code Ann. §18.2-6l (1986). 
5 CO!TIIlent, Sexism and the CO!!U1IOn Law: Spousal Rape in Virginia, 8 Geo. Mason 
U. L. Rev. 369, 385-387 (1986). 
6 Va. Code Ann. §18.2-6l,67.l,67.2,67.2:l (SUpp. 1986). 
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relate to the issue of marital rape. Initially, this article will explain the 
law governing marital rape in the C<JmroIl\olea1th of Virginia. It will examine the 
language used in the statute to determine the limits of the law. Finally, this 
article will analyze the barriers to complete statutory elimination of the cammon law 
marital rape exemption. 
I. 'l't!e Law RegaIdim Marital Rape in Viwinia. 
On January 20, 1986, House Bill 378 was introduced in the Virginia legislature. 
The bill was passed by the Senate on March 4, 1986, and by the House of Delegates 
on March 6, 1986. House Bill 378 is now codified as Section 18.2-61 of the Virginia 
Code. This section reads as follows: 
B. If any person has sexual intercourse with his or her spouse 
and such act is accomplished against the spouse's will by force, 
threat or intimidation of or against the spouse or another, he or 
she shall be guilty of rape. 
However, no person shall be found guilty under this subsec-
tion unless, at the time of the alleged offense, (i) the spouses 
were living separate and apart, or (ii) the defendant caused 
serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or 
violence. 
Additionally, there shall be no prosecution under this 
subsection unless the spouse or saneone acting on the spouse's 
behalf reports the violation to a law enforcement agency within 
ten days of the ccmnission of the alleged offense. However, the 
ten-day limitation shall not apply while the spouse is physically 
unable to make such report or7is restrained or otherwise prevented from reporting the violation. 
The enforcement section of the statute contains provisions for violators after 
they are found guilty as well as proviSions for violators before a trial judgment is 
entered. The enforcement sections reads as follows: 
C. A violation of this section shall be punishable, in the 
discretion of the court or jury, by confinement in the penitenti-
ary for life or for any term not less than five years. In any 
case deemed appropriate by the court, all or part of any sentence 
imposed for a violation of subsection B may be suspended upon the 
defendant's completion of counseling or therapy, if not already 
provided, in the manner prescribed under Section 19.2-218.1 if, 
after consideration of the views of the camp1aining witness and 
such other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such 
action will promote maintenance of the family unit and will be in 
the best interest of the complaining witness. 
D. Upon a finding of guilt under subsection B in any case tried 
by the court without a jury, the court, without entering a 
judgment of guilt, upon motion of the defendant and with the 
consent of the complaining witness and the attorney for the 
Commonwealth, may defer further proceedings and place the defen-
dant on probation pending completion of counseling or therapy, if 
not already provided, in the manner prescribed under Section 
19.2-218.1. If the defendant fails to so complete such counseling 
or therapy, the court may make final disposition of the case and 
proceed as otherwise provided. If such counseling is completed as 
prescribed under Section 19.2-218.1, the court may discharge the 
defendant and dismiss the proceedings against him if, after 
consideration of the view of the camp1aining witness and such 
other evidence as may be relevant, the court finds such action 
will pramote maintenance of the family unit and be in the best 
7 Va. Code Ann. §18.2-61(B) (SUpp.1986). 
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interest of the complaining witness.8 
The Virginia statute quite clearly rejects the cOlllllOn law marital rape exemp-
tion. In Virginia it is now possible to prosecute a husband for raping his wife or a 
wife for raping her husband. However, the statute does not eliminate the marital rape 
exemption completely. In fact, the Virginia statute only allows prosecution for 
marital rape in two circumstances. The first situation in which it is possible to 
prosecute for marital rape is where the spouses were living separate and apart at the 
time of the violation. The second situation is where the defendant caused serious 
physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence. In either situation, 
the spouse or saneone acting on the spouse I s behalf must report the violation to a law 
enforcement agency within ten days of the commission of the alleged offense, unless 
the spouse is physically unable to make such a report or is restrained from reporting 
the violation. Since victims of rape by saneone other than their spouse do not have 
to comply with the ten-day limit, this reporting requirement may violate the equal 
protection clause of the Constitution.9 The statute itself seems clear at first 
glance; however, interpretation of the statute may pose sane problems. 
II. Interpretation of the Virginia Marital Rape statute 
Since this statute should ultimately be judged by how effective it is at decreas-
ing or eliminating the incidence of marital rape, it becomes inperative to examine 
the language of the statute and the possible irrplications of interpretation of the 
statute. 
Reguir""'ffl't of Sep;lrate and wrt 
Under the Virginia statute, absent a showing of serious physical injury, a 
marital rape prosecution can occur only if _ the spouses are living separate and 
apart. This separate and apart requirement is problematic, and will no doubt be the 
subject of much litigation. 
Because the statute was enacted after the Weishaupt and Kizer decisions, there is 
a presumption that the legislature was aware of those decisions. TWs, if the 
legislature had wanted to overrule Weishaupt and Kizer it would have expressly done 
so. As a result, the statute must be interpreted in light of the existing case law. 
The first concern of the separate and apart requirement is what length of 
time will suffice for the spouses properly being labeled as living separate and 
apart. The statute is noticeably silent on this issue and as a result it will be left 
to judicial interpretation. It is quite reasonable to suggest that courts will 
probably not find that a mere day or week satisfies the living separate and apart 
requirement. However, after that, it becomes harder to state what constitutes living 
separate and apart. 
The inclusion of the term "living" before the phrase "separate and apart" 
8 Va. Code Ann. S18 .2-61 (C) (D) (SUr:p. 1986). 
9 Constitutional analysis is beyond the scope of this article. ~, ~,24 
J. FAM. L. 87 (1985); Cormnent, supra note 5; T. Clancy, Equal Protection Considera-
tions of the Spousal Sexual Assault Exclusion, 16 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
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provides insight into the intent of this legislation. "Living" inplies a certain 
continuousness of separation. lO Thus, "living" clarifies the separate and apart 
requirement, but it does not answer the question of how long the two spouses must 
actually be living separate and apart to fulfill that requirement. Insight, may 'be 
gained by examining what length of time has been deemed by the Virginia courts to 
satisfy the requirement. Although these cases were decided prior to the enactment of 
the statute, they provide some guidance/precedent. In Weishauptll, the Virginia 
SUpreme Court affirmed the conviction of Ronald Weishaupt who raped his wife after 
living separate and apart for a little over eleven months. In ~12, the spouses 
were separate and apart for three weeks prior to the alleged rape (although in Kizer, 
the spouses had lived separate and apart previously), and the Virginia SUpreme Court 
stated that "the evidence establishes that the parties lived separate and apart".13 
One may conclude that the actual time limit for living separate and apart is relative-
ly brief. This conclusion suggests there may be a related issue that is more impor-
tant than the time limit of living separate and apart. That issue is consent. 
The issue of consent is the foundation underlying the living separate and apart 
requirement. If the spouses are living together the marital rape exenption still 
applies (unless the defendant caused serious physical injury) based on the theory that 
the spouses have consented to marital sex. By living separate ,and apart, the consent 
to marital sex has been withdrawn. It is reasonable to equate the separate and 
apart requirement with a lack of consent in that actually living separate and apart is 
a nanifestation of the withdrawal of consent. There are potential problems with this 
also, as the two previous court cases have used different standards to measure a 
manifestation of living separate and apart. In Weishaupt, a unanimous Virginia 
Supreme Court held: 
A wife can unilaterally revoke her inTplied consent to marital 
sex where, as here, she has made manifest her intent to terminate 
the marital relationship by living separate and apart from her 
husband, refraining from voluntary sexual intercourse with her 
husband, and in light of all the circumstances, conducting hriself 
in a manner that established a de facto end to the marriage. 
Under this test, the length of time spouses are living separate and apart 
is not of primary concern. The critical element is whether the spouse intends to end 
the relationship. Judicial interpretation of the new statute may also require the 
spouse manifest an intention to end the marriage to fulfill the separate and apart 
requirement. Unfortunately, this test is conplicated, less than six months after 
Weishaupt, the Virginia SUpreme Court modified the Weishaupt rule in Kizer. The Kizer 
majority held: 
[w]e think it is apparent that the wife subjectively considered 
the marriage fractured beyond repair when the parties separated in 
February. Nevertheless, we cannot say that this subjective 
10 Black's Law Dictionary, 843 (5th ed. 1979), defines "living" as "[e]xisting, 
surviving, or continuing in operation. Also means to abide, to dwell, to eside and 
literally signifies the pecuniary resources by means of which one exists." 
11 Weishaupt v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984). 
12 Kizer v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984). 
13 ~ at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294. 
14 Weishaupt, 227 Va. 389, 405, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855. 
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intent was manifested objectively to the husband, in view of the 
wife's vacillating conduct, so that he perceived, or rea~gat>ly 
should have perceived, that the marriage actually was ended. 
The significance of this modification of Weishaupt is that the spouse Jmlst 
manifest her intent to end the marriage to her spouse rather than to an objective 
observer. Unfortunately, this "modification, for which the court offered no ration-
ale, undeniably increases the wife's burden of proof in a spousal rape case."16 In 
sum, it appears that the phrase nliving separate and apartn will be construed to mean 
that the spouses are residing separate and apart and that a manifest intent to end the 
marriage has been cOImlUnicated to the other spouse. 
The spouses need not have cararenced divorce proceedings to fulfill the statutory 
requirement of living separate and apart. Similarly, the statute does not speak to 
what amount of contact between the spouses will preclude viewing them as living 
separate and apart. Thus, the court will determine if the spouses were actually 
living separate and apart at the time of the rape in order to prosecute the spouse 
under the statute. If the Virginia SUpreme Court continues to follow~, it will 
require that the spouses behavior be unequivocal, definite, and certain17 to demon-
strate an end to the marriage by living separate and apart. At a minimum this would 
require that the spouse refrain from voluntary sexual intercourse with the defendant18 
and exhibit conduct that establishes an actual end to the marriage.19 This means that 
contact between the two spouses is permissible but there can be no ambivalence or 
uncertainty carmmicated between the spouses that would suggest that the marriage is 
not over. COnsidering the facts of K1-~, the Virginia SUpreme COurt was very firm 
regarding the requirement that the behavior be unequivocal, definite and certain.20 
As a result of these recent Virginia SUpreme Court decisions,2l the statu-
tory language nliving separate and apartn should be construed to mean that the spouses 
are residing separate and apart and that an unequivocal, definite and certain intent 
to end the marriage has been manifested objectively to the defendant so that the 
defendant perceived or reasonably should have perceived that the marriage was ended. 
RlegUirf"'N't of serioos Physical InjUry 
Under the Virginia statute, if the spouses are not living separate and apart at 
15 Kizer, 228 Va. 256, 261, 321 S.E.2d 291, 294. 
16 Comment, sUPra note 5, at 383. 
17 Kizer, 228 Va. at 262, 321 S.E.2d at 294. 
18 Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 405, 315 S.E.2d at 855. 
19 Kizer, 228 Va. at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294. 
20 The majority in Kizer characterized the wife's conduct as vaCillating; 
thus, the husband did not know that the marriage was over. However, the husband and 
wife were on their way to consult a lawyer about obtaining legal separation. They did 
not see the lawyer because she did not want to put another emotional burden on her 
husband who was worried about his seriously ill father. Additionally, the husband 
already had initiated court action to obtain custody of their child, which seems to 
indicate that in fact he did perceive the marriage to be over. 228 Va. 256, 262, 321 
S.E.2d 291,294 (Thomas, J. and carrico, C.J., dissenting). 
21 ~ Weishaupt, 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 and Kizer, 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 
291. 
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the time of the rape, the spouse may not be prosecuted unless the defendant caused 
serious physical injury to the spouse by the use of force or violence. Because a 
significant number of the marital rape prosecutions will arise under this section, it 
is necessary to explore its meaning in some detail. The issues of consent and serious 
physical injury must be examined. 
Because the spouses may still be living together and presumably no intent to end 
the marriage has been camrunicated, the issue of whether the spouse consented to 
marital sex with the defendant becomes a major concern. If the spouse freely consent-
ed to marital sex it would not be characterized as rape; thus, statute applies only in 
those cases where the wife does not consent to sexual intercourse. Most likely, 
courts will hold that as long as two spouses are living together; there will be 
consent to sexual intercourse. Therefore most prosecutions will result in cases 
involving serious physical injury. 
The serious physical injury requirement establishes a formidable hurdle to 
prosecuting a spouse for marital rape. The language of the statute implies that any 
harm that occurs to the spouse during marital sex, short of serious physical injury, 
is not within the scope of this requirement. The statute does not allow marital rape 
prosecution for minor physical injury. 
The use of the phrase "by the use of force or violence" only increases that 
hurdle. The Virginia legislature clearly wrote a statute that would limit the nl.lIl'ber 
of marital rape cases. The use of the word violence22 signifies a legislative 
concern that only extreme cases be prosecuted under this statute. 23 
This statute will not allow prosecution of a defendant who rapes his spouse under 
the threat of serious physical injury. serious physical injury must in fact occur. 
This requirement causes obvious problems. SuR?Qse that a defendant rapes his spouse, 
threatening to harm a child if the spouse does not engage in sexual intercourse. 
Under the statute, this would not constitute marital rape, because the defendant did 
not cause serious physical injury. Consider the case where a defendant rapes his 
spouse at gun point. No one would deny that the spouse was raped, yet the defendant 
did not cause serious physical injury to the spouse. The language of the statute 
would indicate that while this behavior is certainly reprehensible, it is also beyond 
the scope of the statute. These exanples clearly establish the inadequacy of the 
statute. Although there may be reasons for not enacting a more expansive statute, no 
one can deny that the scope of this statute is clearly limited. 
The virginia statute is silent as to psychological injury caused by the spouSe. 
Because recent stUdies have indicated that the psychological harm suffered by the 
victim in a marital rape is significant,24 this should warrant prosecution. 
In sumnary, the serious physical injury requirement inq;x>ses a heavy statutory 
22 Black's Law Dictionary, 1408 (5th ed. 1979), defines "violence" as an "[u]n-
just or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the accomplishment of vehemence, 
outrage or fury." 
23 The Virginia legislature could have enacted a statute requiring that the 
defendant cause physical injury to the spouse by the use of force. This wording 
would have expanded the scope of protection afforded by the statute. 
24 Marital rape victims, like their nonspousal rape counterparts, must live with 
the effects of being raped and the psychological torture that follows. Additionally, 
marital rape victims usually are faced with the devastating circumstances of living 
with their rapist and their betrayal. ~ D. p'§ffll, RaPe In Marriage (1982) • 
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burden on a prosecutor seeking conviction under the Virginia marital rape statute. 
It is likely that only a limited mmtler of cases will surmount that hurdle. 
Penalties of the Virginia statute 
Under the enforcement section of the statute, a court may sentence a violator to 
five years to life in the state penitentiary. In cases where the court deems it 
appropriate, all or part of the sentence can be suspended and the defendant may be 
recommended for counseling or psychological therapy instead. This alternative 
punishment is inappropriate in a rape statute. 
The substitution of counseling or therapy for violation of the statute conveys 
the attitude that the offense is not serious. Nonspousal rape defendants are not 
afforded the lUXUry of having a court decide to let them forego a prison term and 
instead be placed in counseling. 25 In addition, the counseling statute26 does not 
contain any durational requirements, though presumably the court would impose a 
specified period of treatment. 
A second concern with the enforcement section of the statute is the emphasis it 
attaches to the prOiOOtion and maintenance of the family unit. It would be difficult 
to imagine a statute allowing a convicted murderer or one convicted of fraud to forego 
prison simply to preserve the family unit. Yet in a case where the defendant engages 
in an activity that is itself destructive of the family unit, the court is given the 
option of placing the defendant in counseling or therapy in order to prarote or 
maintain the family unit. The statute treats marital rape as a social problem rather 
than a crime. The counseling or therapy option is a remnant of the camon law 
attitude towards marital rape. 
It is obvious that the option of counseling or therapy should not be available 
where the spouses are in the process of divorce, as there is no family unit to 
preserve. Similarly, the option of counseling or therapy should be unavailable in 
cases where the rape occurred while the spouses were living separate and apart. 
The psychological counseling statutorily available to the court is an obvious 
escape clause in the enforcement of the marital rape statute. Given the destructive 
nature of the crime, n [j]udges should construe the counseling and therapy proviSiOns 
narrowly and recognize that only the strongest of mitigating factors could justify the 
substitution of treatment for criminal penalties in this area of the law. n27 
The extent of the Virginia marital rape statute is limited, due in part to 
continuing allegiance to outdated COJmOOn law ideas. While the statute is a step 
toward reform, it is not the giant step which is necessary. 
Even after the passage of the Virginia statute, many spouses are not protected 
from the horrors of marital rape. The statute defines marital rape too narrowly. 
The statute must be amended to completely eliminate the marital rape exenpt:ion. 
25 section l8.2-6l(c) (6) of the Virginia Code only allows counseling if the 
defendant is prosecuted under section B of the statute, which deals with marital rape; 
thus nonspousal rape defendants are not permitted to go through counseling under 
l8.2-{j1. VA. CODE ANN. S18.2-{jl (SUpp. 1986). 
26 VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-2l8.l. 
27 Comnent, supra note 5, at 386. 
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Several states have already adopted statutes which prohibit all marital rape. 28 
Although these states have experienced considerable success, it is inportant to 
discuss the possible reasons for rejecting a similar marital rape statute in Virginia. 
In. Barriers to Reform 
Opposition to the complete elimination of the marital rape exemption generally 
revolves around three arguments. First is the inherent evidentiary problems presented 
by a marital rape prosecution. Second, legislators fear vindictive spouses who might 
use a claim of marital rape as a tool for coercion. Finally, sane carrnentators argue 
that prosecution hinders marital reconciliation. 
Because the major difference between marital sex and marital rape is the lack of 
spousal consent, many opposed to elimination of the exemption suggest it is difficult 
to determine consent when dealing with marital rape. This argument is illogical and 
hypocritical. If it were followed to its logical conclusion, this argument would not 
permit prosecution for crimes that are difficult to prove. Many crimes are difficult 
to prove [however] and no one has suggested reroving them for that reason.29 In 
addition, II [d) ifficulties with evidence and proof in rape cases are not unique in the 
marital setting, but are characteristics of several crimes ,in general".30 Neverthe-
less, every state allows prosecutions for nonspousal rape. Although it is true that 
in a marital rape prosecution it is one spouse's word against the other's, the same is 
true outside of the marital context.31 Generally, the courts are not forced to rely 
merely on the spouse's testimony, "[t]he presence of bruises and contusions on the 
victim militates against the conclusion that the intercourse was consensual. .. 32 
The marital rape exemption should not be retained sinply because of evidentiary 
difficulties. 
The second argument against eliminating the marital rape exemption is 'the 
"vindictive spouse" theory. This argument suggests that a spouse would use the 
charge of marital rape to harm the other spouse. Those opposed to statutory reform 
suggest that the marital rape charge would becane a tool of coercion to be used in 
bargaining for alimony, child custody and property settlements. The fear of fabricat-
ed charges from vindictive spouses contradicts the argument concerning a lack of 
evidence. Certainly a spouse would be in a better bargaining position if she fabri-
cated a charge that would be more readily accepted by our courts. If lack of evidence 
for a marital rape charge renders a conviction difficult, then a vindictive spouse 
28 See Fla. stat. Ann. §794.011 (West Supp. 1985) 1 Ran. stat. Ann. §21-3502 
(Supp. 1984h Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch 265, §22 (West SUpp. 1985h Reb. Rev. stat. 
§§163.355-.375 (1985b vt. stat. Ann. tit. 13 §3252 (Supp. 1985b Wisc:. stat. Arm. 
§940.255(6) (West SuPP. 1985). In People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d 152, 474 N.E.2d 567, 
485 N.Y.S.2d 207 (1984), New York reroved its marital rape exemption. In Warren 
v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221, Georgia did not allow the marital rape exemp-
tion. 
29 M. Freeman, But If You Can't Rape Your Wife, Whom Can You Rape? The Marital 
Rape Exemption Re-examined, 15 Fall. L. Q. 1, 18 (1981). 
30 Comment, Rape in Marriage: The Law in Texas and the Need for Reform, 32 
~lor L. Rev. 109, 114 (1980). 
31 COIIIIIEnt, The Marital Rape Exemption in pennsylavania: "With This Ring ••• n, 86 
Dick. L. Rev. 79, 109 (1981). 
32 & p. 109. 
26 
could be expected to use other more effective false charges for coercion. Additional-
ly, if the vindictive spouse argtUOeIlt is true, excluding marital rape charges would do 
little to stop a spouse who could claim charges of assault,33 false imprisonment, 
child abuse, severe emotional distress, fraud, or other charges. If this argmnent 
were true, court should be inundated with claims by vindictive spouses and their 
fabricated charges. Quite the contrary occurred in Oregon where the marital rape 
exenption was eliminated. Peter Sandrock, an Oregon district attorney, testifying 
before the Senate JUdiciary carmi.ttee in the California legislature, said that Oregon 
had no problems after passage of a bill allowing wives to press charges against 
their husbands. 34 The Georgia Supreme Court was adamant in its skepticism of this 
argtUOeIlt when it stated: "[t]here is no other crime we can think of in which all of 
the victims are denied protection simply because someone might fabricate a charge; 
there is no evidence that wives have flooded the district attorneys with revenge 
filled tnmp!d-up charges ... 35 This may be due to the fact that a marital rape charge 
is very embarrassing for the victim,36 and most victims elect to privatize the 
experience.37 The misplaced fear of vindictive spouses should not stand in the way of 
legislative reform to afford married persons the same protection offered their 
unmarried counterparts. 
The third argument advanced against elimination of the marital rape exenption is 
that allowing prosecutions for marital rape would undermine or prevent marital 
reconciliation. This argument neglects the fact that when rape occurs in a marriage 
the spouses very well may be better off apart. 38 This argument does not justify 
denying a spouse a remedy when a rape has occurred. If the legislature truly believes 
that marital reconciliation is more important than prosecuting a spouse for rape, 
they should deny other causes of action that might be disruptive to marital recon-
ciliation. Yet, spouses may still bring actions against each other on a variety of 
charges. There must be a weighing of concerns and statutory protection from the 
abuse of marital rape should outweigh the unlikely chance of marital reconciliation. 
Conclusion 
Virginia's new statute allowing prosecution for marital rape in a limited number 
of circumstances is a step in the right direction. One JIllst realize however, 
that the scope of the Virginia statute is narrow, and it is only the first step on 
the road to reform. Virginia has cast aside the outdated C<IIIIlPn law view of Chief 
Justice Hale. Now is the time to statutorily eliminate the marital rape exenption, 
and afford everyone the same protection from rape. It should make no difference in 
33 Comnent, Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 Marg. L. Rev. 120, 126 (1981). 
34 S. Barry, Spousal Rape: The UnCO!!lllOn Law, 66 A.B.A.J. 1088, 1091 (1980). 
35 Warren v. State, 255 Ga. 151, 336 S.E.2d 221, 225 (1985). 
36 Comnent, supra note 31, at 107. 
37 Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 99 Harv. ~ Rev. 1255, 1269 (1986). 
38 weishaupt v. Conmonwealth, 227 Va. 389, 405, 315 S.E.2d 847, 855 (1984). 
"[I]f the marriage has already deteriorated to the point where intercourse IIlIst be 
comranded at the price of violence we doubt that there is anything left to recon-
cile." IQ. ~ also, Corment, supra note 30, at 115. 
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the eyes of the law whether the victim of rape is a stranger or a spouse. Rape is a 
violent crime that should be prosecuted. 
28 
RELIGIOUS USES OF LARD AND ZORIIG: fiE REED FOR A HEW FRAIIBWOU 
Gary C10se* 
In seventeen words the First Amendment prohibits Congress, 
and by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
states,l from creating legislation which would prohibit the free 
exercise of religion. aCongress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof ••• • 2 Any government action which touches on religious 
activity then is potentially an impermissible infringement on 
free exercise rights. However, the Supreme Court has not 
interpreted the First Amendment to give blanket immunity from 
governmental regulation to religious activity. The freedom to 
believe is absolute, but the right to act on those beliefs is 
sometimes subject to governmental regulation. 3 Some level of 
regulatory interaction between church and state is inevitable. 
Churches do not exist in a vacuum. 
The problem which zoning poses is at what level of govern-
mental zoning .regulation are free exercise issues brought to 
play? That is, when is a church's right to be left alone 
violated by a zoning ordinance? In Lemon v. Kurtzman,4 the 
Supreme Court expressly cited zoning regulations as a permissible 
governmental "contact" with religious conduct. The Court did not 
say when the permissible governmental contact becomes impermis-
sible. State and lower federal courts have had to make this 
decision. These decisions have been inconsistent in large 
measure because the Supreme Court has yet to develop a clear test 
to determine when an infringement on free exercise rights has 
occurred. While Sherbert v. Verner5 is the accepted standard by 
which to judge free exercise issues, it is by no means clear. 6 
Sherbert balances the governmental interest against the church's 
First Amendment interest. But before it does so, the analysis 
asks whether the ordinance impacts on a central religious 
belief. Sherbert may make use of "religious belief" as part of 
*Gary Close is a 3rd year law student at Marshall-Wythe, a member 
of the state board of directors for the Virginia Society for 
Human Life, Co-Chairman of the Marshall-Wythe Federalist Society 
and former newseditor for the STAR-EXPONENT in Culpeper, Vir-
ginia. 
1 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). 
2 U.S. Const. Amend. I. 
3 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
4 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971). 
5 376 U.S. 403 (1963). 
6 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 813-835 (1978). 
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its test, but the Supreme Court has constantly refused to define 
what constitutes a valid religious belief. 7 Without knowing what 
constitutes a valid religious belief, protected by First Amend-
ment heightened scrutiny standards, it is hard to know what uses 
of land are more central to religious belief and, therefore, are 
more likely to qualify for First Amendment protection. 
This lack of a clear standard leaves lower courts with no 
guidance when faced with the competing interest of the state to 
control land use and the church's desire to operate free from 
governmental interference. Often municipalities argue, and 
courts accept, narrow definitions of religious activity. This 
places most church action in the secular field, such as building 
construction, and beyond the sticky standards of review required 
by Sherbert. Other courts rule that almost any activity under-
taken by churches is protected by the First Amendment and, 
therefore, immune from zoning regulations. 
Throughout the country churches and municipalities are 
clashing over zoning regulations. In Fairhaven, Massachusetts, 
local zoning administrators ruled that Bible studies were home 
occupations and, therefore, prohibited under the city's zoning 
ordinances. 8 In Fairfax County, Virginia, a zoning administra-
tor's attempt to define permissible religious activity, in the 
context of the county's zoning plan, raised a public furor among 
county congregations. 9 He ruled that activity not within the 
county's definition was prohibited without a special permit. 
Presently, the City of Colorado Springs is seeking an injunction 
to halt worship services in a private home. The city argues the 
worship services are in violation of its zoning regulations. lO 
The general consensus among many religious leaders is that 
churches more often than not are losing zoning cases once the 
issue gets to court. ll "The courts have been extremely skeptical 
of religious organizations claiming special dispensation," said 
Geoffrey Stone, a professor at the University of Chicago Law 
School, in a recent Washington Post article on the issue. 12 
As one commentator has already noted. there is no guarantee 
7 Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security 
Division, 450 U.S. 707 (1981). Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 
U.S. 67 (1953). 
8 Swallow, "Church-State Dispute Finds A New Arena: Zoning 
Boards," Washington Post, Oct. 21, 1985, at A-I. 
9 Id.~ Zoning Intepretation Number 52, Fairfax County Zoning 
Department, Fairfax, VA, June 14, 1984. 
10 City of Colorado springs v. Richard Blanche, Civ. Action 
No. 85 CU 3241, Division No.5 (1986). 
11 Washington Post at A-8. 
12 Id. 
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that the application of zoning laws, a twentieth century inven-
tion, will not over time undermine the protections granted 
churches in the constit:ution. 13 What is needed, before the issue 
becomes more politicized, is an analysis of the competing 
interests and a clear test designed to fairly address those 
interests. 
Part I. Roots of the Conflict: The State's Interest in Zoning. 
That there is a conflict between the land control interests 
of the state and the church's desire for unhindered activity 
seems to come as no surprise to anyone. Indeed, most commenta-
tors on the general subject foind conflict between the two 
inevitable. 14 One commentator found the conflict due to new 
roles taken on by churches, such as church schools and day care 
centers, and a concurrent furor on the part of zoning officials 
to regulate anything that moved. 15 
Zoning is an outgrowth of the state's expanded role in 
society. It is a vehicle for public control and direction over 
private land use. 16 In 1916, New York City passed the first 
comprehensive zoning ordinance. Others followed New York's 
lead. They did not go unchallenged, and in 1926, the Supreme 
Court ruled on the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning 
ordinances. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,17 the Court 
came down solidly on the side of zoning ordinances. They are a 
valid exercise of the state's broad police powers, and as such 
are valid unless they are clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, and 
have no substantial relation to the public's health, safety, 
morals or general welfare. 18 
The zoning power of municipalities was reaffirmed and more 
strongly entrenched after the Supreme Court's Belle Terre 19 
decision. In that decision, Justice Douglas outlined the proper 
goals of zoning and the power from which the state may enforce 
ordinances to achieve those goals. 
13 Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, 
and the Free Exercise of Religion, 76 NW. U.L. Rev. 786, 790 
(1981) • 
14 Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power Versus the 
First Amendment, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 767 (1985) 1 Note, Land Use 
Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1562 
(1984)1 Walker, What Constitutes a Religious Use For Zoning 
Purposes, 27 Cath. Law. 129 (1982). 
15 64 B.U.L. Rev. at 768, fn. 14. 
16 76 NW. U. L. Rev., supra note at 795. 
17 272 U.S. 365 (1926) • 
18 Id. at 391. 
19 416 U.S. 1 (1974) • 
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A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and 
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in 
a land-use project addressed to family needs. The 
police power is not confined to elimination of filth, 
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to layout 
zones where family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclus~~n and clean air make the 
area a sanctuary for people. 
Creation of quiet neighborhoods is a valid governmental 
objective according to Belle Terre. Exclusion of churches from 
neighborhoods is often based on that very objective. The 
reasoning used is that churches create noise and traffic prob-
lems. Belle Terre encourages localities to exclude those activi-
ties that create noise and traffic, including churches, to 
preserve peace in residential neighborhoods. 
However, where fundamental freedoms are involved, the 
Supreme Court has, since Belle Terre, placed some limits on a 
municipality's zoning powers. Two cases, Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland2l and Schad v. Mount Ephraim,22 have carved out niches 
in the state's overall zoning power. In Moore, just three years 
after the Belle Terre decision, the Court held that where 
fundamental freedoms are infringed upon, zoning ordinances must 
come under a heightened standard of review -- the "rational 
relation" test outlined in Belle Terre does not apply.23 
In ~, the contested ordinance excluded all live enter-
tainment, including nude dancing, from the municipality. The 
Court found this restricted expression protected by the First 
Amendment. The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional. The 
Court's rationale is especially relevant to the problem of this 
article. Although Justice White acknowledged the broad power of 
local governments to zone land, he also stressed that, "The 
zoning power must be exercised within constitutional limits.n24 
Where constitutional protections are threatened, White set out a 
two-tiered standard of review. First, White said the standard of 
review for a zoning ordinance is "determined by the right 
assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the power being 
exercised. n25 Since the right being threatened in ~ was 
protected by the First Amendment, the Court used a strict 
20 Id. at 9. 
21 431 u.S. 494 (1977) • 
22 452 u.S. 61 (1981). 
23 12· at 499. 
24 ~, 452 u.S. at 60. 
25 Id. 
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scrutiny standard of review. 26 Secondly, White said a reviewing 
court must decide whether the proponent of the ordinance used the 
least restrictive means to further the legitimate state inter-
est. If not, the ordinance fails. 27 
The Supreme Court applied these two principles to the Schad 
case and found the city ordinance lacking. 
As if to underscore in red ink Justice White's opinion, 
Justice Blackmun wrote a concurrence which reiterates much of 
what White wrote. He made unequivocably sure that the presump-
tion of validity, usually given zoning ordinances, is destroyed 
when First Amendment questions are involved: 
I would emphasize that the presumption of validity that 
traditionally attends a local government's exercise of 
its zoning power carries little, if any, weight where 
the zoning regulation trenches on the ri~~ts of 
expression protected under the First Amendment. 
While municipal ordinances clearly enjoy a strong presumption of 
validity because of the state's broad police powers, the ~ 
opinion makes it equally clear that where protected rights are 
affected, the presumption is sometimes lost. 
Euclid and Belle Terre stand for the proposition that zoning 
regulations are a proper expression of the state's police power 
and enjoy a presumption of validity. The Euclid court said a 
rational relation between the ordinance and the power upon which 
the ordinance was based is all that is required to remain valid 
upon judicial review. 
Moore and Schad chilled this presumption of validity. 
Where fundamental freedoms, including freedom of worship, is 
restricted by a zoning ordinance, the zoning ordinance loses its 
presumption of validity. ~ specifically stands for the 
principle that when a zoning ordinance restricts a protected 
First Amendment activity, the ordinance must pass constitutional 
muster under a strict scrutiny standard. And that higher 
standard is triggered by the mere assertion that First Amendment 
activity is threatened. 
Courts have not applied these principles to zoning 
where churches are involved. The reason is simple. 
disputes 
Churches 
claim the zoning ordinance restricts their free exercise rights. 
Courts react by applying the Sherbert free exercise analysis. 
Often, the analysis ignores Schad and Moore while emphasizing the 
presumption of validity zoning ordinances enjoy under Euclid and 
Belle Terre. 
26 
27 
Id. at 71. 
Id. at 70. 
28 Schad, 452 u.S. at 77. 
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Part II. ~be ~raditional Analysis Applied by Courts: 
Sherbert v. Verner. 
Once a religious group claims a zoning ordinance infringes 
on their free exercise rights, the courts turn to Braunfeld 
v. Brown 29 and Sherbert v. Verner 30 for guidance. These two 
cases set the standards by which courts determine whether a 
governmental regulation impermissibly restricts religious 
activity. The problem they present is two-fold. Firstly, the 
two cases create different standards of review. Sherbert does 
not overrule Braunfeld, but Sherbert gives a higher level of 
protection to First Amendment free exercise claims than does 
Braunfeld. Secondly, the Sherbert analysis, when applied by 
courts, is used in a way inconsistent with the Moore and Schad 
decisions. 
In Braunfeld, the Supreme Court upheld a Sunday closing law 
against a free exercise challenge by an Orthodox Jew. He claimed 
the mandated Sunday closing prevented him from compensating for 
business he lost by closing on Saturday: the Sabbath according 
to his faith. The loss in business, he claimed, made it impos-
sible for him to continue in his livelihood and remain true to 
his faith. The Court held that the statute was enacted to 
achieve a legitimate, secular state objective. 3l It did not 
compel a choice between religious practice and criminal penalty; 
-the Sunday law simply regulated a secular activity and, as 
applied to appellants, operated so as to make the practice of 
their religious belief more expensive. n32 Therefore, it passed 
constitutional muster. Braunfeld, then stands for the proposi-
tion that where the purpose of the law is secular, where it 
incidentally burdens religious activity and does not make a 
religious belief criminal --the statute has a presumption of 
validity. 
While not overturning Braunfeld, Sherbert v. Verner greatly 
expanded the extent to which religious interests could be 
protected from state infringement. In Sherbert, the appellant 
was a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired by her employer for 
refusing to work on Saturday--her faith's Sabbath. She could not 
find work and applied for unemployment benefits. The state 
denied her the benefits because she would not accept work when 
offered. Apparently, the work offered to the Seventh-Day 
Adventist required Saturday hours. The law required applicants 
for unemployment to look for work. If work was offered, the 
29 366 U.S. 599 (1961). 
30 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
31 ~~sunf~ld, 366 U.S. at 606. 
32 ~. at 605. 
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applicant had to accept the job. Failure to do so triggered 
cessation of the unemployment benefits. 
The Court struck down the state law upon which unemployment 
benefits had been denied. To force her to accept work contrary 
to her religious beliefs in order to receive unemployment 
benefits was an impermissible infringement the Court said. 
Braunfeld and Sherbert are inconsistent. The Braunfeld 
Court held that where a law with a secular purpose incidentally 
burdens religious practice, the law has a presumption of vali-
dity. The Sherbert Court held that a law with a secular purpose 
may be invalid when it has an incidental effect on religious 
practice. The conflict is obvious and noted by Justices Stewart, 
Harlan, and White in their concurring opinions to Sherbert. 
Despite this inconsistency, the majority opinion refused to 
overrule Braunfeld. The result is two separate tests for free 
exercise analysis. 
Inconsistency is one legacy of Sherbert. Another legacy is 
the tripartite test outlined in the opinion. To determine 
whether or not legislation impermissibly infringes on free 
exercise rights, the Court will ask: (a) does the government 
action burden the practice of a particular religious belief,33 
(b) if yes, is there a compelling state interest for doing so,34 
and (c) if so, did the government use the means for accomplishing 
this interest which are least restrictive on the religious 
practice?35 If the public interest is compelling and no less 
restrictive means are available, then the regulation passes 
constitutional muster. 
How have lower courts applied the Sherbert test? City of 
Chula Vista v. pagard36 and Grosz v. City of Miami Beach37 both 
offer an example of the test's application. A close reading of 
the two cases shows that the courts, in effect do not apply the 
Sherbert test. Either court's ignore the religious nature of the 
activity regulated as in Chula Vista or they ignore the Sherbert 
analysis as in Grosz. 
Part III. Problems in the Current Analysis 
The problems in current free exercise analysis, when applied 
33 ~be[bert, 374 u.S. at 403. 
34 Id. at 406. 
35 Id. at 407. 
36 159 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1981) • 
37 721 F.2d 729 (1983) • 
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to zoning disputes, has not gone unnoticed. 38 Two of the more 
recent comments on the issue have summarized together the major 
flaws in the analysis touched upon by other commentators. 39 
1. The Note Analysis. 40 
A note in the 1984 Columbia Law Review specifically identi-
fies three major problems in the court's free exercise test. the 
first, and perhaps most damaging problem from the perspective of 
churches, is the evaluation of the religious practice. In the 
Sherbert analysis, this is the first step courts should take. 
Whether they follow Sherbert or not, all courts evaluate the 
religious nature of the burdened activity if for no other reason 
than that churches claim a religious activity i2 burdened by the 
zoning regulations. "This is an important threshold inquiry, for 
if a burdened practice is not deemed to be religious, it merits 
no free exercise protection--regardless of whether the public 
interest is compelling and the regulation narrowly drawn."4l 
There are two approaches to deciding whether a practice is 
of religious significance: (1) the sinceritv of the group's 
claim42 or, (2) the centrality of that practice to the group's 
religion. The note correctly points out that evaluation by 
sincerity, the court's assessment of the religious group's good 
faith, is more in keeping with Thomas v. Review board and its 
injunction against a court using secular standards by which to 
judge the validity of religious beliefs. In Thomas, a Jehovah's 
Witness quit his job at a steel plant because it produced steel 
for weapons. He felt working at the plant conflicted with his 
religious beliefs. The state refused to give him unemployment 
benefits. The state argued that Thomas resigned not because of 
religious reasons, but more because of personal philosophical 
preferences. Therefore, the state argued, it was not obligated 
to give Thomas unemployment benefits. 
The trial court agreed with the state, but the Supreme Court 
did not. Wrote Chief Justice Burger: 
Relgious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, 
38 ~, Reynolds, Zoning the Church: The Police Power 
Versus the First Amendment. 64 B.U.L. Rev. 767 (1984); Preysner, 
Zoning the Church: Toward a Concept of Reasonableness. 12 
Conn. L. Rev. (1980). 
39 Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause. 
84 Colum. L. Rev. 1562 (1984); Walker, What Constitutes a 
Religious Use for Zoning Purposes, 27 Cath. Law. 129 (1982). 
40 Note, ~ note 64. 
41 Id. at 1573. 
42 See, Note, Religious Exemptions Under the Free Exercise 
Clause: A Model of Competing Authorities. 90 Yale L. J. 350, 
371 (1980) (the note suggests religious sincerity may be measured 
by the lack of profit or accumulation of material gains associat-
ed with the religious belief). 
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consistent or comprehensible to others in order to 
merit First Amendment protection ••• c~urts are not 
arbiters of scriptural "interpretation.· 
The Court accepted Thomas' good faith claim that he quit his job 
because of his religious beliefs. 
The second approach to deciding whether a practice is of 
re1gious significance is the centrality approach. According to 
the note, the determination of what is "central"; to a re1gious 
faith and, therefore, worthy of First Amendment protection 
invites arbitrary judicial evaluation of what constitutes a 
re1gious belief or practice. In effect, a court uses its values 
in determining whether or not a religion's practices are worthy 
of protection. The Chula Vista analysis is a good example of 
this kind of process. In Chula Vista, a religious group's 
communal living arrangements was deemed in violation of zoning 
ordinances. The courts ruled against the religious group. The 
religious group's communal living was, according to the court's 
standards, a secular expression of be1iefi despite the fact that 
the defendants ·sincere1y believed" communal living to be 
"affected with religious character."44 The court decided 
communal living was not central to the sect's religion despite 
the fact that the sect defined communal living as central to its 
faith. Once the re1gious practice is deemed secular, the 
analysis stops. The state is not required to demonstrate a less 
restrictive means of regulation was unavailable. According to 
the note, the centrality analysis should not be a threshold 
test. Judging the centrality of a religious belief is at best 
slippery. It ought to be left to the end of the analysis, or a 
last resort, after sure and concrete First Amendment safeguards 
have been examined and found lacking. 
The second problem the note identifies in the present free 
exercise analysis is the nature of the permitted burden. The 
language of Sherbert allows for manipulation by courts to find 
only a very narrow range of burdens on re1gious practices. 
sherbert invites courts to find at the outset that a practice is 
not re1gious. Chula Vista is an example of this. Because the 
re1gious burdens in zoning cases are not "severe, life-threaten-
ing economic sanctions,·45 but rather burdens of ·convenience, 
dollars or aesthetics,a46 they are dismissed as unimportant. But 
the note correctly points out that nothing in the Sherbert 
decision indicates that the free exercise protections should be 
drawn so narrowly. Because they are drawn narrowly, most courts 
43 Thomas, 450 u.S. at 714, 715, 716. 
44 Chula Vista, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 36. 
45 Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 306. 
46 Grosz, 721 F.2d at 739. 
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find the asserted practice outside the protections of the First 
Amendment. 
The third identified problem is the overwhelming strength of 
the asserted governmental interest in zoning matters. When the 
analysis reaches the balancing stage, it almost invariably tips 
in the government's favor. Zoning regulations are tied to the 
state's strongest interest--the health, safety, and welfare of 
society as a whole. The church's interest pales in comparison. 
2. The Walker Test. 47 
Drawing on Sherbert, Moore, Thomas v. Review Board and a 
number of New York state cases, Walker argues that free exercise 
issues should be decided with sensitivity to First Amendment 
protections. He argues that presently in zoning cases courts try 
to ignore free exercise issues rather than grapple with their 
complexities. The most common approaches are to find the alleged 
relgious use secular or to find it outside the "corea of relgious 
belief. Once a use is found secular, courts apply a rational 
basis standard of review. Walker argues this unnecessarily 
restricts protected relgious activity and opens up much religious 
activity to state regulation. The problem in present free 
exercise analysis in zoning cases according to Walker, stated 
simply, is that lower courts are not following the heightened 
standards of review required when relgious activity is infringed 
upon. Part of the reason for this lapse is the narrow defini-
tions of religious activity used. 
3. Proposed Solutions. 
The Walker article calls for use of the Sherbert analysis 48 
but within a more rigidly defined framework. First, he advocates 
an expanded conception of relgious activity. This brings many 
more zoning cases under the Sherbert analysis. Secondly, he says 
to be consistent with Moore and Thomas v. Review Board, courts 
should address only the sincerity of the belief--not its central-
ity to the relgious faith as a whole. 
The note advocates a more radical change in the court's free 
exercise analysis. It lowers the threshold for free exercise 
issues to come into play, expands the concept of impermissible 
burdens on religion, restructures how we should evaluate the 
government's interest, and then balances the two interests. The 
new test will, according to the note, lessen the number of 
rejected religious claims based upon a threshold analysis. 
First, the note calls for postponement of judicial inquiry 
into the centrality of the relgious use until the end of the 
47 Walker, ~ note 64. 
48 Id. at 182, 183. 
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analysis. It adopts a ·sincerity" standard, just as Walker does, 
in order for a free exercise analysis to be triggered. If a good 
faith claim is made by a religious group that its land use is 
protected from zoning ordinances because of religious be1ief---
the court will accept the claim. This is in keeping with ~, 
which held that judicial review should be based on the right 
nasserted1y threatened" rather than the power being exercised. 49 
Postponing the centrality issue also forces the state to first 
make a case for the importance of its interest rather than 
dismissing the church's interest before a balancing analysis is 
started. 50 
Secondly, the note would expand the concept of impermissible 
re1gious burdens. The note points to Wisconsin v. Yoder51 as 
support for this proposition. In Wisconsin, a neutral state 
education law affected a relgious practice. The Supreme Court 
found it to impermissibly infringe on the free exercise rights of 
Amish parents to control the education of their children. Under 
Braunfeld, it would stand. But Yoder held even indirect effects 
of religious-neutral laws can create impermissible burdens. 
Again, this acts to expand the area in which free exercise 
analysis is applicable. Thus, the effect of this stage of the 
note analysis would be to bring any law that impacted on relgious 
practice under a free exercise analysis. 
Thirdly, the note shifts the emphasis on the government's 
interest. Rather than focus on whether the interest is "compel-
ling," the note requires judicial inquiry into the possibilities 
for compromise. The burden falls upon the state to prove why 
compromise is not acceptable. Whether or not the state can show 
that compromise is impossible is a factual finding for courts to 
make. 
Lastly, the note analysis requires balancing the burden on 
the relgious practice against the governmental interest. The 
note suggests that severity of burden to the religious interest 
should be measured by the degree to which the regulation actually 
inhibits religious observances. 
As a guidepost in determining the relgious burden, the note 
suggests a "centrality" analysis. The Sherbert analysis, as is, 
tempts courts to make the determinations at the beginning of the 
inquiry. Here, it is near the end. The court initially deter-
mines if the regulation touches upon something that is "central" 
to the sect's belief and practice. The more central the regulat-
ed belief or practice, the greater the burden on the religion. 
49 ~, 452 U.S. at 71. 
50 Note, ~ note 64 at 1578. 
51 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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The flaw with the "centralityn test as pointed out earlier is the 
sUbstitution of judicial values and conceptions as to what is 
central to a sect's belief for the sect's own interpretation of 
its belief system. 
Part V. Conclusion 
What the note and Walker analysis does is give a presumption 
of validity to free exercise claims. It is up to the government 
to prove why a relgious exemption should not be granted. There 
is nothing wrong with this shift. It flows logically from the 
Schad and ~ decisions. They indicated First Amendment 
freedoms, those fundamental to individual liberty, should be 
given a high degree of protection. Presently, in zoning cases, 
First Amendment freedoms are not being protected. Religious uses 
are found secular by courts and, therefore, outside free exercise 
analysis. The note analysis brings these uses into the free 
exercise realm as they should be. According to ~, the right 
assertedly threatened should trigger the standard of review. 
Does the note analysis mean life will be easier for zoning 
officials or for neighborhoods where yards are wide and blue-eyed 
children run free? The answer is no. Municipalities and home 
owners will have to accommodate religious uses of property. 
Increased traffic, loud hymn singing, church bells, and unruly 
church crowds will all have to be endured by neighborhoods where 
churches locate. First Amendment freedoms, in order to flourish, 
often require accommodation from other segments of society: 
The courts have repeatedly held that citizens must 
endure a certain amount of inconvenience in order to 
protect First Amendment rights ••• There are numerous 
instances in which a citizen's lesser protected rights 
are forced to yield ~f the higher protection for a 
First Amendment right. 
The note analysis merely brings church use of land into the realm 
of First Amendment protection where it belongs. 
52 Comments, 76 NW. U. L. Rev. at 808. 
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THE TIME IS RIPE FOR A SMALL CLAIMS COURT IN VIRGINIA 
D.E. Barney* 
A woman vacated her Northern Virginia apartment this Fall, and a 
common scenario ensued. Her landlord notified her that her $183 
security deposit would not be returned due to damage the landlord 
claimed the tenant had done to the residence. Unlike many 
vacating tenants who acquiesce in this type of landlord embezzle-
ment to avoid haggling, this woman sought to recover her de-
posit. Upon inquiry, she found that her only recourse was 
through the Virginia General District Court, where small claims 
can be pursued ~ see Unfortunately, the woman is not well 
versed in the intricacies of Virginia's landlord-tenant law; 
proceeding RLQ §g was not a realistic option. She retained an 
attorney who recovered her $183 and then billed her $500, the 
fair value of his services. While the verdict vindicated the 
tenant's rights as a matter of principle, the final accounting 
failed to corroborate this result. 
Virginia's lack of a special small claims court places 
claimants of small amounts in a quandary: either proceed pro §g 
and hope that the District Court judge will help the litigants 
with points of law and that the other party will not have an 
attorney, hire and pay a lawyer of one's own, or forego a claim 
entirely. The first alternative is risky at best, the second is 
often prohibitive, and the third is patently unacceptable. A 
statutory small claims court is necessary so that such claimants 
have a forum where facts can be pled to a judge charged with 
aiding the parties, hearing the facts, and researching and 
applying the law. 
The problem with Virginia's system of handling small claims 
is that the system often does not work in the interest of 
justice. Although the judges are competent and fair, and the 
litigants have an opportunity to be heard, this system does not 
serve the ideals of a small claims forum. Such a forum relaxes 
strict procedural and evidentiary rules to facilitate efficient 
resolution of disputes. Litigants face each other on equal 
footing without attorney manipulation, allowing judges to 
question witnesses in an informal proceeding. This type of 
proceeding can resolve a dispute over a small amount of money 
quickly, simply and inexpensively. In other words, such a 
forum makes the litigation of small claims feasible. 
Virginia's present system of handling small claims through 
the General District Court appears workable on its face and in 
*Dale Barney is a graduate of the University of Virginia, and a 
third year law student at Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College 
of William & Mary. He is a member of the Editorial Staff and the 
school's Jessup Moot Court team. 
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theory. The lack of standard small claims ground rules however, 
injects an element of uncertainty into these proceedings which 
reduces the potential for producing justice. fLQ §g litigants' 
haven't the ability to handle rules of evidence, thus the 
presentation of evidence is often haphazard, incomplete, and 
uninformative. Litigants must make the difficult choice of 
paying a la.wyer to represent them on small claims matters, or of 
proceeding ~ se and hoping that the opponent has also chosen to 
forego professional representation. Judges mayor may not choose 
to assist RLQ se litigants with the presentation of cases; 
litigants may therefore lose cases simply because they fail to 
understand complex rules of procedure and evidence. The sum of 
these factors leads to the inevitable conclusion that the 
Virginia system of hearing small claims fails to provide a 
satisfactory forum for these cases. 
Proposals for a special small claims court in Virginia meet 
the standard objections which await governmental expenditures in 
a state which is seemingly obsessed with minimizing budgets 
regardless of the social costs. Like the "pay-as-you-go" 
financing which held Virginia's highway development program 
hostage until bond financing was approved recently, taxations' 
perennial opponents' pat indignation at expenditures of any type 
threatens the future of a small claims court as well as the 
rights of litigants suing on small claims. While the creation of 
a small claims court will cost money, cases heard there will save 
docket time and costs in General District Court. More important-
ly, marginal increases in expenditures on the Virginia court 
system will result in major advances in the protection and 
vindication of the rights of citizens of this state. 
Like the recent creation of Virginia's Intermediate Court of 
Appeals, the adoption of a small claims court is well overdue. 
While fiscal responsibility is a proper goal for the state 
legislature to pursue, such concerns are misguided when they 
prevail at the expense of a fair and accessible justice system. 
The citizens of Virginia hold the legislature responsible for 
limiting expenditures of state tax dollars. However, those same 
citizens require that state judicial remedies be equally avail-
able to all citizens, regardless of the size of the claim 
involved or the claimant's ability to hire a lawyer. A small 
claims court in Virginia can provide fair hearings to claimants 
with small disputes more fully than can the current General 
District Court structure. Despite the best efforts of competent 
judges in the General District Courts, the system used in these 
courts to hear small claims does not guarantee justice in many 
cases. Although the current small claims system may produce some 
injustices, the refusal of a powerful minority to allocate 
resources for a more efficient and accessible small claims court 
42 
in fairness to the majority of citizens creates a much greater 
injustice. 
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